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A Socioeconomic Approach to Assessing Price Competition between Private 





An LA/AIDS model is developed to estimate demand elasticities for packages of 
8-oz shredded cheese for higher- and lower-income consumers. Data used in this study 
are scanner data for six supermarket stores in two distinct socioeconomic areas.  Results 
show that: (1) lower-income shoppers are more price-sensitive than higher-income 
shoppers for both private labels and national brands; (2) compared with private labels, 
consumers are very sensitive to national brands price changes even in higher-income 
areas; (3) cross-price elasticities between private labels and national brands are all 
positive, i.e., private labels and national brands are substitutes in both lower- and higher-
income stores; and (4) the number of promoted items does not have a statistically 
significant impact on sales; instead, the percentage of price discount affects sales for both 
private labels and national brands. 
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A Socioeconomic Approach to Assessing Price Competition between Private 
Labels and National Brands: The Case of Shredded Cheese 
 
1. Introduction 
Competition between ￿national brands￿ and ￿private labels￿ has taken on greater 
importance in the retail food industry.  Private labels or store brands are created and 
controlled by retailers.  According to Information Resources Incorporated (IRI), market 
share of store brand grocery products has increased from 15% in 1988 to 21% in 1999.  
Sales of store brands have increased from $150 million in 1988 to over $43.3 billion in 
1999.  In 1999, Kroger’s private label realized two cents for every food dollar spent in 
America (Thompson 1999).  Thus, identifying and understanding the factors, such as 
pricing and quality that influence the competitive interaction between private labels and 
national brands has been a primary concern of retailers and manufacturers. 
During the past decade, studies on marketing strategy with emphasis on 
competition issues between private labels and national brands have been addressed.  For 
example, a number of studies analyzed the price setting behavior and market share for 
private labels and national brands (e.g., Cotterill and Putsis 2000; Putsis 1997; Raju, 
Sethuraman, and Dhar 1995a).  Sethuraman (1995) used meta-analysis to investigate the 
cross-promotional effect between private labels and national brands.  Some researchers 
(e.g., Cotterill and Putsis 2001; Cotterill, Putsis and Dhar 2000; Hoch 1996) focused on 
the strategic and competitive interaction between private labels and national brands. 
Moreover, several studies focused on the performance and success strategy of private       3 
 
 
labels (e.g., Dick, Jain, and Richardson 1997; Hoch and Banerji 1993; Hoch, 
Montgomery, and Park 2001; Raju, Sethuraman, and Dhar 1995b; Sayman, Hoch, and 
Raju 2001).  However, little research has addressed the competition issues between 
different consumer demographic characteristics.  
Consumer demographic characteristics within retail trading areas have been 
shown to impact store-level price sensitivities. Hoch, Kim, Montgomery, and Rossi (1995) 
showed that the consumer demographic variables are much more influential than 
competitive variables. Jones (Jones and Mustiful 1996; Jones 1997) found that major 
differences exist in the consumer food purchasing behavior of higher- and lower-income 
shoppers. These results suggest that it is important to take into account the socioeconomic 
characteristics of consumers within store areas when examining competition between 
private labels and national brands. 
The sales of cheese have matured in supermarkets.  ￿In 1999, the $7.2 billion 
retail cheese category, which is an increase of 9% dollar share compared to 1998, showed 
volume gains of 3.7%.  This is the highest increase the category has seen in the past four 
years, despite the fact that the average price per lb was up 5.1% from 1998￿ (Berry 2000).   
According to Dairy Management Inc. (DMI), per capita consumption of cheese has 
increased from 17.5 lbs in 1980 to 30.5 lbs in 2000 and is expected to reach 35 lbs by 
2005, a two-fold increase.  
A key objective of this paper is to investigate differences in price sensitivity and 
promotion effects for higher- and lower-income shoppers in the purchase of private labels 
and national brands of shredded cheese products.  This paper is organized as follows.        4 
 
 
The literature review is provided in section 2; the research method is described in section 
3; empirical results are presented in section 4; managerial implications and future 
research directions are discussed in section 5; and the conclusions are presented in 
Section 6.  
 
2.   Literature Review  
2.1 Own-Price  Effect 
Economic theory stipulates a negative own-price elasticity, i.e., the law of 
demand.  In empirical studies, the negative own price elasticity of cheese products has 
been confirmed.  For example, Maynard and Liu (1999) used A. C. Nielson weekly 
scanner data to estimate price elasticities for four different styles of cheese by various 
demand models.  The own price elasticity of shredded cheese ranged from ￿1.70 to ￿2.66.  
Cotterill and Samson (2002) estimated a brand-level demand system for five brands of 
American cheese products to evaluate unilateral and coordinated market power strategies.  
The data provided by Information Resource Inc. (IRI) are market level for 33 U.S. cities, 
quarterly from 1988 to 1992.  They found negative own price elasticities for five brands 
of American cheese; furthermore, the price elasticity for private label is more elastic than 
for Kraft but less elastic than for Borden.  
Sethuraman (1995) used Information Resource Inc. (IRI) store-level scanner data 
to estimate 261 cross-price elasticities for six product categories: bathroom tissue, fabric 
softener, flour, margarine, orange juice, and tuna.  He concluded that average own-price       5 
 
 
elasticity is -3.23 across all brands, -3.17 for national brands, and        -3.43 for private 
labels.  Cotterill and Putsis (2000) used 143 food product categories and 59 geographic 
markets to develop a model that captures variation in private label-national brand share 
and pricing across categories and markets.  They found negative own-price elasticities; 
however, the own-price elasticity of private labels (-0.98) was found to be less elastic 
than for national brands (-1.07). 
Hoch, Kim, Montgomery, and Rossi (1995) used weekly scanner data to estimate 
18 product categories, including store-specific price elasticities for a chain of 83 
supermarkets. They found that the price sensitivities were related to a comprehensive set 
of demographic and competitor variables that described the trading areas of each of the 
stores. Particularly noteworthy is that, for the product category of dairy cheese, income 
has a negative relationship to store-level price elasticity. That is, the higher-income store 
showed lower price elasticities. 
 
2.2  Cross-Price Effect and Price Promotion Effect 
According to economic theory, cross-price elasticities are expected to be positive 
for substitute goods.  In this paper, positive cross-price elasticities should be interpreted 
to represent brand substitution in the product category of shredded cheese.  Price 
promotion effects on brand substitution at the retail level have been revealed in marketing 
literature by using store-level scanner data.  For example, Kumar and Leone (1988) used 
Information Resources Inc. (IRI) store level scanner data and hierarchical, cross-sectional, 
and time-series models to examine the effect of retail store price promotion, featuring,       6 
 
 
and displays on sales of brands of disposable diapers within a city.  Within a store, price 
promotion produced the largest amount of brand substitution, followed by featuring and 
displays. 
 Walters (1991) investigated the impact of retail price promotions on consumer 
purchasing patterns and the performance of competing retailers.  He developed a 
conceptual framework for retail promotional effects that includes brand substitution 
effects, interstore sales displacements, and the effects of promotions on complementary 
goods.  Results are generally supportive of the framework and show that retail price 
promotions created significant complementary and substitution effects within the store.    
Mulhern and Leone (1991) reviewed multiple-product pricing and developed a theoretical 
framework for retail pricing and promotion policies based on the implicit price bundling 
of related products.  They empirically calibrated how the regular and deal prices of 
individual brands influence the sales of substitute and complementary items.   
Furthermore, Mulhern and Leone (1991) pointed out that strong cross-relationships, 
indicating substitution behavior, are present among the brands in the cake mix category. 
Relative to price competition between private labels and national brands, 
Sethuraman (1995) investigated whether price discounts by national brands influence 
private labels sales and vice versa, through meta-analysis of 261 cross-price elasticity 
estimates from six product categories in three supermarket-chains.  He concluded that, on 
average, price reductions by national brands and private labels have more or less equal 
influence on each others￿ sales.  However, there is greater variation in the effect of 
private-label price cuts across national brands.  He further indicated that national brands 
with large market shares decrease private-label sales through price cuts but are seldom       7 
 
 
affected by private-label discounts.  National brands with lower relative prices have 
greater influence on private-label sales and are also affected more by private-label price 
cuts.  
Putsis (1997) used Information Resources Inc. (IRI) market level scanner data 
from 1991 to 1992 for 135 food product categories and 59 geographic markets to 
investigate price, promotion and competitive effects between private labels and national 
brands.  The empirical results showed that price followship, although weak in general, is 
stronger for private labels than for national brands products: a 1% decrease in national 
brands price produced a 0.12 percent private labels price decrease; by contrast, a 1% 
decrease in private labels price produced only a 0.07 percent national brands price 
response.  Furthermore, the market share of private labels has anticipated price effect, i.e., 
a higher market share of private labels lowers national brands prices and raises private 
labels prices. 
Cotterill and colleagues (Cotterill and Putsis 2000; Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar 
2000; Cotterill and Putsis 2001) have investigated price setting behavior and strategic 
interaction between private labels and national brands.  Their key findings include: (1) 
demand response to price and promotion is decidedly asymmetric; (2) consumer response 
to price and promotion decisions (demand) and firm pricing behavior (supply) jointly 
determine observed market prices and market shares; and (3) markets characterized by 
higher national brand market share and higher supermarket concentration tend to have 
higher prices for both national brands and private labels.  
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2.3  Consumers￿ Perception of Price and Quality for Private Labels 
versus National Brands 
Consumers￿ perception of the relationship between price and quality appears to be 
a key factor when consumers make brand choice decision between private labels and 
national brands (Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999).  Quality can be defined as ￿the totality of 
features and characteristics of a product or service that bear on its ability to satisfy stated 
or implied needs￿ (Kotler, 2000).  Quality also can be represented in two forms: objective 
and subjective quality.  The former refers to actual quality, while the latter refers to what 
the consumer perceives as quality.  Gabor and Granger (1966) found strong evidence that 
consumers use price as an indicator of quality at the individual level.  McConnell (1968) 
further showed that most consumers do use price as a signal of brand quality.   
Some research studies have shown that consumers use price to infer product 
quality (e.g., Huber and McCann, 1982; Nelson, 1970; Rao and Monroe, 1989).  Shapiro 
(1968) concluded that some consumers choose high-priced brands in order to reduce the 
risk of choosing inferior products.  Monroe (1973) showed that consumers believe price 
and quality are positively related and they often infer quality from price.  The price-
quality correlation may lead consumers to expect to pay a higher price for a higher- 
quality brand than for a lower-quality brand (Levin and Johnson, 1984).  Winer (1986) 
indicated that, for frequently purchased products, consumers learn from experience that 
there is a positive correlation between a product￿s price and its quality.  This expectation 
simplifies the choice decision by allowing consumers to infer product quality from price 
alone, without actual product trial (Pechmann and Ratneshwar, 1992).  That is,       9 
 
 
consumers perceive the higher priced brand as being a better quality brand than other 
brands.   
  In terms of consumer judgments of private label quality, research supports the 
view that private labels are perceived to have a lower quality than national brands (e.g., 
Bushman, 1993, Hite, et al., 1991, Rosen, 1984).  Applebaum and Goldberg (1967) 
reported that consumers perceive differences between private labels and national brands.  
In particular, they noted that national brands are perceived to be higher in quality while 
private labels are perceived to be reasonably priced.  Bellizzi et al. (1981) concluded that 
there is a statistically significant perceptual difference between national brands and 
private labels.  National brands scored higher than private labels on quality, reliability, 
and prestige.  Similar findings were also obtained by Cunningham et al. (1982).  
Richardson, Dick, and Jain (1994) examined the relative importance of extrinsic 
cues versus intrinsic cues in determining perceptions of private labels quality in an 
experiment using a sample of 1564 shoppers for five products.  One of the five products 
is cheese slices for private labels and national brands (Kraft brand).  In their study, 
extrinsic cues are product attributes that are not part of the physical product, such as price 
and brand name; on the other hand, intrinsic cues cannot be changed without altering the 
physical nature of the product, such as product ingredient and taste.  The important 
findings of their experimental study included: (1) regardless of ingredients, national 
brands are perceived to be of higher quality than private labels; (2) extrinsic cues (e.g., 
brand name) are more influential than intrinsic cues (e.g., ingredients); and (3) perceived 
quality has a greater influence on consumer decision making than value-for-money - - 
even for purchasers of private labels.             10 
 
 
3. Research  Method 
3.1 Data 
The data used in this study are store-level scanner data provided by a national 
supermarket chain in the Columbus, Ohio metropolitan area (CMA).  The data represent 
weekly observations including UPC (Universal Product Code), prices, sales quantities, 
customer counts, and total store sales.  The data period covers 69 weeks from December 
2000 to April 2002.  To avoid aggregation bias, this paper focuses on the shredded cheese 
category of 8oz package size and these packages include three brands: private label, Kraft 
(national brand), and all other brands.  For estimation purposes, a third brand of shredded 
cheese, others, is utilized to determine the allocation of expenditure among the brands of 
a product category and make a complete demand system.  In this study, other brands, 
such as Sargento and Borden have a small market share in the shredded cheese category.  
There are 22 UPCs in private label, 27 in national brand, and 25 in other brands.  
To investigate the price competition between private labels and national brands 
related to different socioeconomic conditions, two distinct store groups, higher and 
lower-income groups, are identified from socioeconomic information provided by the 
chain for all residents within a 3-mile radius of each store.  As shown in Table 1, the 
lower-income group (stores 1, 2 and 3) is located in areas that have large proportions of 
lower-income shoppers, while the higher-income group (stores 4, 5 and 6) is located in 
areas that have a large proportion of higher-income shoppers.  These two store groups 
reflect significantly different socioeconomic conditions not only in income, but also in 
race and education.  As shown in Table 1, for example, only 10 percent of the prospective       11 
 
 
shoppers are college graduates in lower-income stores (stores 1, 2 and 3), as compared to 
38 percent in higher-income stores (stores 4, 5 and 6). 
= = Table 1 = = 
3.2  The Empirical Model and Estimation Procedure 
To demonstrate how lower and higher-income consumers differ in price 
sensitivity for private levels and national brands, the brand-level demand systems are 
estimated for these two groups (stores 1, 2 and 3 in the lower-income group; stores 4, 5 
and 6 in the higher-income group).  Assuming weak separability of preferences, a brand 
demand system determines the allocation of expenditure among the brands of a product 
category using brand prices and category expenditure alone.  In this paper, the demand 
system takes the form of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) introduced by Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980). 
The Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) has been widely used in recent years.  
Advantages of the AIDS model include the fact that it is derived from the underlying 
choice axioms and, consistent with neoclassical consumer theory, individual behavior can 
be aggregated to estimate demand parameters consistently from store-level data.  The 
original form of the AIDS model as developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), with 
market share demand function for these three brands, can be written as: 
(1)   ∑ + + =
j
i j ij i i P x p W ) / log( ) log( β γ α                  12 
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The price index, P, is non-linear in its parameters and this creates difficulties for 
empirical estimation. Moschini (1995) has suggested a linear approximation of the AIDS 
model (LA/AIDS) to use alternative price indices as below: 





it i p w P
1
0 * ) ln( ln                     
where 
0
i w  is the market share of brand i in the base period and pit is the price of 
brand i in the period t. 
In contrast with many attraction-type market share models, the LA/AIDS 
functional form is derived from the consumer￿s cost function, and wi is expressed, 
consequently, as a share of expenditure (Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar 2000). Some 
theoretical restrictions are derived from utility theory and directly imposed upon the 
parameters. These are known as the adding-up restriction:∑ =
i
i 1 α , ∑ =
i
i 0 β , and 
∑ =
i
ij 0 γ ; and the homogeneity condition: ∑ =
j
ij 0 γ .       13 
 
 
Equation (1) does not include demographic or marketing variables. Pollak and 
Wales (1978; 1980) propose a translating method to include demographic and marketing 
variables. Within a store, price promotion, featuring and displays can be considered as the 
marketing variables that affect sales of brands. Particularly, price promotion has the most 
significant effect (Kumar and Leone 1988; Mulhern and Leone 1991). Since there is an 
average of 25 UPCs (items) in each brand, the dummy variables can not be used to 
represent the promoted items.  Alternatively, the number of items in a given brand that is 
on promotional price during week t is used to examine the price promotion effect. 
Therefore, the LA/AIDS model can be written as:  
(4)   ∑ + + + + =
j
it i jt ij t ij i it P x p PROM W ε β γ δ α ) / log( ) log(
* *  
        i= 1(private label), 2(national brand), 3(other brands). 
 
The variables and empirical model used in this paper can be represented as below: 
Chart 1.  Definition for variables used in this paper. 
PLSHARE    market share of private label 
NBSHARE   market share of national brand 
OBSHARE   market share of other brands 
PLPROM      the number of items on discount for private label 
NBPROM     the number of items on discount for national brand 
OBPROM     the number of items on discount for other brands 
PLPRICE      natural log of price of private label 
NBPRICE     natural log of price of national brand 
OBPRICE     natural log of price of other brands 
TSALE         natural log of total sales 
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(5)  PLSHARE = α1+δ11PLPROM+δ12NBPROM+δ13OBPROM 
                          +γ11PLPRICE+γ12NBPRICE+γ13OBPRICE 
                          +β1TSALE +ε1  
(6)  NBSHARE = α2+δ21PLPROM+δ22NBPROM+δ23OBPROM 
                          +γ21PLPRICE+γ22NBPRICE+γ23OBPRICE 
                          +β2TSALE +ε2 
(7)  OBSHARE = α3+δ31PLPROM+δ32NBPROM+δ33OBPROM 
                          +γ31PLPRICE+γ32NBPRICE+γ33OBPRICE 
                          +β3TSALE +ε3 
 
The demand systems are estimated for higher-income stores and lower-income 
stores respectively.  There are three stores in each group.  Each store includes 69 weeks.  
Thus, the total observations in each demand system are 207.  The iterative seemingly 
unrelated regression (ITSUR) procedure of the SAS program is used for estimating the 
models in this paper.  There are three equations in each model; the last equation of each 
model is dropped to avoid the singularity problem.  
Once the parameters have been estimated, the demand elsticities can be calculated 
by following Green and Alston (1990).  
The own-price elasticity: 






− + − = ) ( 1 
The cross-price elasticity:       15 
 
 







e ) ( ) (
β γ
− =  
 
4. Empirical  Results 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of variables; Table 3 presents regression 
results using LA/AIDS model; and Table 4 presents estimated demand elasticities.  As 
shown in Table 2, the average price of private labels is $1.80 per 8-oz of shredded cheese 
while national brands price is $2.60 per 8-oz of shredded cheese; i.e., private labels are 
44 percent lower in retail price than national brands.  In terms of market share, private 
labels control 58 percent of the market in higher-income stores and 62 percent of the 
market in lower-income stores.  Meanwhile, national brands control 27 percent of the 
market in higher-income stores and 23 percent of the market in lower-income stores. 
= = Table 2 = = 
= = Table 3 = = 
= = Table 4 = = 
Table 3 indicates that the mathematical signs of the price variables are as 
expected and these variables are statistically significant for both higher- and lower-
income stores.  However, the signs of promotion variables are mixed and not statistically 
significant.  Note that the promotion variables present the number of items on price 
discount in a week.  In other words, the results of promotion variables indicate that the 
number of promoted items does not have a statistically significant impact on sales.  In       16 
 
 
terms of model performance, the goodness of fit measures show reasonably good 
performance (adjusted R-squares between 0.65 and 0.73).  
The own-price and cross-price elasticities between private labels and national 
brands are reported in Table 4.  As expected, the own-price elasticities are all negative.  
Lower-income shoppers have a more elastic own-price elasticity of ￿1.82 for private 
label shredded cheese, as compared to a value of ￿1.56 for higher-income shoppers.  
Likewise, lower-income shoppers are shown to be more price-sensitive toward the 
purchase of national brands of shredded cheese, having an own-price elasticity of ￿3.61 
vs. ￿2.59 for higher income shoppers.  Simply stated, lower-income shoppers are more 
price-sensitive than higher-income shoppers for both private labels and national brands.  
In addition, compared with private labels, consumers are very sensitive to national brands 
price changes even in higher-income areas.   
Table 4 further shows that cross-price elasticities between private labels and 
national brands are all positive, i.e., private labels and national brands are substitutes in 
both lower- and higher-income stores.  Moreover, the brand substitution effects are larger 
in lower-income stores than in higher-income stores.  In higher income stores, private 
labels price increases of one percent causes national brands sale increases of 0.88 percent, 
while national brands price increases of one percent causes private labels sale increases 
of 0.49 percent.  At the same time, in lower-income stores, private labels price increases 
of one percent causes national brands sale increases of 1.16 percent, while national 
brands price increases of one percent causes private labels sale increases of 0.93 percent.  




The empirical results of this paper show that the number of promoted items of 
shredded cheese does not have a statistically significant impact on sales; instead, the 
percentage of price discount affects sales for both private labels and national brands.  
Stated differently, the frequency of price promotions does not affect total sales; instead, 
the depth of price promotions does influence the total sales for both private labels and 
national brands in the shredded cheese product category.  It is particularly important to 
note that, compared with private labels, consumers are very sensitive to national brands 
price changes even in higher-income areas.  As reviewed from the literature in section 2.3, 
several citations support the premise that private labels are seen as inferior quality 
alternatives at value prices.  On the other hand, consumers perceived national brands as 
superior quality at higher prices.  Surprising, in higher-income stores, the own-price 
elasticities are very distinct between private labels and national brands (-1.56 vs. ￿2.59).  
That is, even among the higher-income shoppers, prices are more important than quality 
in the shredded cheese products.  This finding supports the report that ￿Kraft has 
acknowledged that private-label pressure is weighing in the cheese division, but Kraft has 
dealt with such pressures before and working with retailers to narrow the price gaps even 
as it continues creating new products that private-label companies don￿t offer.￿ (The Wall 
Street Journal, April 16, 2003)   
This paper demonstrates the application of the LA/AIDS model in marketing 
strategy research.  This study applied the LA/AIDS model to supermarket scanner data in 
estimating the brand-level demand for a specific product category (8 oz shredded cheese).  
Despite the large amount of literature in applied economics, demand analysis remains       18 
 
 
confined to studies on expenditure levels of broad commodity groups.  Broad commodity 
groups are less important for marketers, who mainly develop strategies at the brand or 
category level.  From the marketers￿ perspective, the analyses of demand at the brand and 
product category levels are more critical than broadly defined commodities.   
To reduce the difficulty of empirical estimation, this study uses a linear 
approximation of the AIDS model (LA/AIDS) to estimate the price elasticities for private 
labels and national brands.  For future research, the original AIDS model can be used to 
analyze the competition behavior between private labels and national brands.  Further, 
from the cheese industry perspective, the product categories need to be more widely 
represented to include other cheese categories, such as sliced cheese.   
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper investigates differences in price sensitivity and promotion effects for 
higher- and lower-income shoppers in the purchase of private labels and national brands 
of shredded cheese products.  A Linear Approximation of the Almost Ideal Demand 
System (LA/AIDS) is used to estimate the brand-level demand system for higher and 
lower income supermarket shoppers.  For managerial and/or decision-making purposes, 
this paper provides new insights into price competition between private labels and 
national brands. An important finding is that price discounts can be used as an effective 
strategy to increase sales of shredded cheese.  Further, this study demonstrates the 
application of the LA/AIDS model to supermarket scanner data in estimating the brand-
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Variables         
      High Income Stores     Low Income Stores 
    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum  Maximum    Mean  Std Dev  Minimum Maximum
Price($)               
  Private Labels  1.84 0.36  1.01 2.71   1.81 0.37  1.01 2.69
  National Brands  2.66 0.30  1.57 2.99   2.64 0.31  1.56 2.99
  Others  2.33 0.24  1.80 2.72   2.27 0.25  1.79 2.76
                 
Sales Value ($/week)              
  Private Labels  1204.98 430.71  366.77 2455.97  1182.80 478.23  360.47 2660.27
  National Brands  538.59 164.33  261.50 1416.13   427.42 208.20  118.79 1309.41
  Others  309.96 160.95  69.74 1135.64   270.74 174.96  16.54 1113.30
                 
Sales Quantity(items/week)             
  Private Labels  707 345  205 1993   715 429  198 2622
  National Brands  212 100  90 912   173 116  41 852
  Others  138 78  26 450  124 83  6 444
                 
Price promoted items(items/week)           
  Private Labels  11 9  0 22  11 9  0 22
  National Brands  3 7  0 25   3 7  0 25
  Others  5 6  0 22   5 5  0 22
                 
Market Share              
  Private Labels  0.58 0.12  0.20 0.83   0.62 0.15  0.25 0.90
  National Brands  0.27 0.08  0.12 0.69   0.23 0.10  0.07 0.63
   Others  0.15 0.07  0.04 0.44    0.15 0.09  0.01 0.45
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Table 3. Regression Result(LA/AIDS Model)         
      High Income Stores    Low Income Stores 
  Parameter  Estimate  Std Err  t Value Pr > |t|    Estimate Std Err  t Value  Pr > |t| 
Dependent Variable: PLSHARE           
  Constant  -0.6138 0.1264 -4.86 <.0001  0.2057 0.1490  1.38  0.1690 
 PLPROM  -0.0024  0.0009  -2.74  0.0067  -0.0049 0.0012  -4.10  <.0001 
  NBPROM  0.0032 0.0012 2.62 0.0096    0.0036  0.0016 2.24 0.0260 
 OBPROM  -0.0115  0.0011 -10.35 <.0001  -0.0105 0.0015  -7.24  <.0001 
 PLPRICE  -0.2268  0.0417  -5.44  <.0001  -0.4837 0.0573  -8.45  <.0001 
 NBPRICE  0.5526  0.0602  9.18  <.0001   0.7270  0.0767  9.48  <.0001 
  OBPRICE  -0.3259        -0.2434     
  TSALE  0.1649 0.0192 8.57 <.0001   0.0412  0.0233 1.77 0.0779 
  Adj R-Square: 0.67        Adj R-Square: 0.65   
                
Dependent Variable: NBSHARE           
  Constant  0.9159 0.0824  11.12  <.0001   0.2688  0.0925 2.91 0.0041 
  PLPROM  0.0004 0.0006 0.72 0.4754    0.0019  0.0007 2.50 0.0130 
  NBPROM  -0.0012 0.0008 -1.43 0.1538   0.0000 0.0010  0.00  0.9968 
 OBPROM  0.0057  0.0007  7.82  <.0001   0.0055  0.0009  6.09  <.0001 
 PLPRICE  0.0828  0.0271  3.05  0.0026   0.2214  0.0355  6.23  <.0001 
 NBPRICE  -0.4509  0.0392 -11.49 <.0001  -0.6026 0.0476 -12.66 <.0001 
  OBPRICE  0.3680        0.3812     
  TSALE  -0.0866 0.0125 -6.91 <.0001  0.0088 0.0144  0.61  0.5426 
   Adj R-Square: 0.69             Adj R-Square: 0.73    




Table 4. The Estimated Own-price and Cross-price Elasticities  


















0.88 -2.59    1.16 -3.61 
 